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In 1984, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão chose a 
policy of national unity as the key strategy 
for liberating the Homeland. Although some 
comrades‐in‐arms disagreed at the time, 
national unity continued gaining momen-
tum and, 15 years later, Timor-Leste finally 
achieved its desired goal. Thirty years later, 
history is now repeating itself … (Araújo 
16/2/2015:3) 
I believe he was right in his assertion, and that we 
should contemplate the intricate problem of the 
relationships between a broad ‘political entente’ and 
the requirements of democratic performance in 
an institutional framework in the long run, going 
back to Xanana’s leadership of the liberation strug-
gle. Certainly, not only is there room in democracy 
for political institutions to accommodate partisan 
cooperation on a large scale in parallel with regu-
lated competition, but for any democratic polity to 
stand on its feet there must be some form of such 
‘political entente’ translated into actual forms of 
inclusion. At the very least, a communality of posi-
tions must occur on the foundations of public life, 
starting with the country’s constitution and funda-
mental institutions, but eventually being far more 
comprehensive. The interesting point, therefore, is to 
question the manner in which ‘political entente’ can 
be formulated in practical terms, and how the nor-
mal tension between consensus and dissent among 
political actors can be framed. This comprises the 
current Timorese option for a ‘Government of 
National Unity’, but does not exclude other forms, 
complementary or alternative to such a solution.
In this Discussion Paper, I consider first the 
academic debate on the estab-
lishment of democracy and the 
role of political competition and 
cooperation as a background to 
the current Timorese government 
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Introduction
In his inauguration speech on 16 February 2015, 
Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araújo announced 
the mantra of his new government: ‘the members 
of the Sixth Government will put the interests 
of the people above any other partisan interests’ 
(16/2/2015:2). Resorting to this rhetorical topos 
may be warranted by the major realignment of 
the parliamentary support for the new govern-
ment (commonly referred to as ‘National Unity’ 
or ‘National Inclusion’) now headed by a member 
of what was until then the sole opposition party, 
but the implicit disjunction between ‘people’s’ and 
‘parties’’ interests suggests a political discourse 
emerging from a populist, authoritarian ethos 
rather than from the tradition of liberal democra-
cies. The Minister of State at the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, Agio Pereira, claims that the 
bold political move that accompanied the resigna-
tion of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão midway 
through his term and led to the reconfiguration of 
the political landscape — by means of a new gov-
ernmental formula that defied established assump-
tions imposed in the transitional period and in 
force after independence — represents a trans-
formation of ‘belligerent democracy to consensus 
democracy’ (24/1/2014).1 Formed in the national 
parliament and observing the basic rules of Timor-
Leste’s constitution, there is no reason to assume 
that Araújo’s government contradicts formal pre-
scriptions of a democratic polity. However, it can 
be scrutinised and the wisdom of its underlying 
assumptions called into debate from the perspec-
tive of the long and winding road that leads to the 
consolidation of democracy.
Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araújo made an 
explicit point by placing his political choices in the 
context of the history of the Resistance, saying: 
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formula. This is followed by a brief historical tour 
of the idea of institutional inclusion in the Timor-
ese recent past (including actual opposition to it) 
in order to frame the following discussion of some 
problems that the inauguration of a new form of 
government may pose in the process of democratic 
consolidation. I shall then address the rationale for 
change that may explain the decision to revert to 
the new formula, whose merits and limitations will 
also be discussed. Finally, one and a half years after 
the inauguration of the new government, Timor-
Leste has been shaken by political events that call 
into question whether the scope of ‘inclusion’ of its 
basis is actually so broad as to embody ‘national 
unity’, as important players (such as President Taur 
Matan Ruak) appear to be challenging critical deci-
sions of Rui Maria de Araújo and his government. 
The end of History is not in sight.
The Timor-Leste Path to Consolidation of 
Democracy: A Comparative Approach
One of the innovations brought to the public arena 
by the case of Timor-Leste was the decision to 
embark simultaneously on a process of state-build-
ing and democracy-building (Tansey 2009). If, in 
abstract, theoretical terms, there is no contradiction 
between those two processes, they are neverthe-
less interconnected and impinge one on the other 
(Linz and Stepan 1996:24–28). Alas, in the real 
world, not all good things always go together, and 
the promotion of democracy may entail the estab-
lishment of conflicting objectives with other con-
curring projects (Grimm and Leininger 2012:397–
98). It is in the light of these considerations that I 
propose to reflect on the emergence of the ‘Gov-
ernment of National Unity’ in February 2015. Two 
aspects will be considered: the timing of its cre-
ation, and the relationship it establishes with the 
principle of political inclusion. This is a broad con-
cept that, on a general level, refers to the capacity 
a given institutional framework exhibits to encom-
pass the vast majority of political actors within its 
perimeter. In a narrower sense, as is currently being 
used in Timor-Leste, it designates a governmental 
solution that moves beyond the normal party com-
petition, in which some assume executive power 
and other(s) form an opposition, to embrace the 
major rival parties in a common platform. Party 
competition is therefore transferred, as it were, 
from the House — its traditional locus — to the 
council of ministers, and formal opposition tends 
to vanish from institutional life.
When considering the long history of the estab-
lishment of democracy, the debate about transitions 
from authoritarianism, or the most pressing issues 
in post-conflict societies striving to establish con-
stitutionalism, the question emerges of the timing 
for the appearance of electoral competition — and 
its consequences. Fareed Zakaria (1997) has argued 
that the elaboration of institutional foundations 
for political competition and the establishment of 
the basic tenets of the rule of law have historically 
taken precedence over overt party contestation. 
Granting franchise to wide sectors of the popula-
tion and forging mass political organisations came 
after the ‘liberal’ institutions that are incorporated 
in our notion of modern democracy were solidly 
implemented and sustained by restricted civic 
rights. For conservative thinkers, only this prec-
edence could guarantee that the rule of law would 
not be overturned by ‘the mob’. For this reason, 
they tend to support delaying (and restricting) 
competition. This approach can be viewed as a 
form of taming the revolutionary effects of popular 
participation, that is, as ‘making democracy safe for 
the world’ (Maier 1992:126). 
However, Miller (2013) has shown that an 
early enlargement of franchise and the staging of 
competitive elections has recently been favoured 
in several countries, namely during Huntington’s 
‘third wave of democratisation’ (1991). Not all have 
been successful, and some ended up travelling 
the route of what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
(2002, 2010) have termed ‘competitive authoritari-
anism’, that is to say, hybrid regimes that combine 
in a populist way a democratic façade that includes 
several procedures akin to the democratic devices, 
with a structural tendency to authoritarian solu-
tions. In these cases, rapid electoral competition 
has gone hand in hand with limited respect for civil 
liberties (Miller 2013:8). For this reason, Zaka-
ria places ‘paper power’ before ‘people power’, and 
adds: 
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It’s crucial that before the first elections, 
before politicians gain enormous legitimacy 
through the polls, a system is put in place 
that limits governmental power and protects 
individual liberty and the rights of minorities 
… The focus should be less on elections and 
more on constitutions …  
(Zakaria 25/03/2013:33) 
Processes of transition to democracy have resorted 
to different models which have caught the atten-
tion of political scientists since the 1980s (Linz and 
Stepan 1996; O’Donnell et al. 1986). The nature of 
the process, whether it is a ‘pacted transition’ (the 
model for which is the case of Spain in 1976–78, 
and that was also present in many eastern European 
nations at the end of communist rule), or else one 
that manifests itself by means of a ‘rupture’ (as was 
the case in Portugal in 1974 and, to a large extent, 
Timor-Leste), has important consequences for the 
ways in which the emerging democratic polity may 
evolve. Again, the existence of a new political con-
sensus among the elites (at least) before the onset of 
open party confrontation that may enshrine some 
form of sectarianism seems to be a fundamental 
element in the whole process. Likewise, elections in 
post-conflict societies normally require special con-
siderations and the previous consolidation of work-
ing arrangements amenable to all stakeholders that 
limit the powers of those fighting in the polls and 
adequately guarantee the protection of minorities 
(Reilly 2008).
Arend Lijphart’s seminal piece on ‘Constitu-
tional Design for Divided Societies’ (2004) argues 
that it is possible to draw some generic lessons from 
the myriad constitutional design experiments that 
the world has witnessed in recent times. One of 
the most critical constitutional provisions in young 
democracies in divided societies refers to the adop-
tion of measures of political inclusion that promote 
power-sharing and limit the concentration of pow-
ers. These are far more vast than the government 
formula. But Lijphart also reminds us that ‘[t]he 
relative success of a power-sharing system is contin-
gent upon the specific mechanisms devised to yield 
the broad representation that constitutes its core’ 
(2004:99). At least three instrumental decisions 
were taken by the Timorese constitutional drafters 
that fit into this mould. 
First, the consecration of a truly universal fran-
chise of all citizens aged 17 and above, without any 
sort of discrimination. Universal suffrage is increas-
ingly the rule of the game, but not all countries 
have moved so swiftly and boldly into the incorpo-
ration of the younger generation in the life of the 
res publica. 
Second, proportional representation as opposed 
to ‘first past the post’, or ‘winner take all’, electoral 
systems falls neatly in this category of instruments, 
and is widely considered to provide the best frame-
work for democratic development. The need for 
inclusive electoral systems was also noticed by 
Larry Diamond who stated that ‘[i]f any generali-
zation about institutional design is sustainable … 
it is that majoritarian systems are ill-advised for 
countries with deep … emotional and polarizing 
divisions’ (1999:104). However, as Ben Reilly has 
remarked, ‘electoral system choices to promote 
power-sharing are highly context-specific’ (Reilly 
2008:171), and the peculiarities of the Timorese 
choice are not relevant at the moment. Allowing for 
this reminder, the adoption of proportional repre-
sentation is consistent with the overall goal of pro-
moting power-sharing and limiting the excesses of 
majority rule. It contributes to an inclusive parlia-
ment at the core of the political system, open to the 
presence of significant minorities, with an in-built 
mechanism reducing incentives for excessive con-
centration of powers. 
Third, the choice of semi-presidentialism as 
the government system is a factor that stresses both 
inclusiveness and power limitations. Gianfranco 
Pasquino (2007) relates that semi-presidentialism 
has been credited with helping democracies to con-
tain and dismiss undemocratic challenges by signif-
icant political actors given the likelihood that some 
form of Lijphardt’s ‘consensus democracy’ (1984) 
— a combination of decision-making effectiveness 
and a fair amount of agreement among the political 
elites — will prevail in a system that does not live 
by the ‘winner take all’ rule. This retrieves Sartori’s 
argument in favour of a flexible system (1997). The 
‘relative advantage’ of semi-presidentialism is cor-
roborated by Jorge Novais for whom ‘flexibility’ 
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translates into a better equilibrium and division 
of powers, a greater capacity to integrate different 
political and institutional actors, and an enhanced 
tendency to overcome blockages (2007:139). It has 
also been stressed that Timorese semi-presidential-
ism has created a tradition of choosing ‘independ-
ent’ presidents capable of defusing tensions and 
enlarging the circle of those who ‘sit at the table’, 
and as such has performed according to the neces-
sity to reinforce the system’s capacity to be inclu-
sive, that is, to create ways through which a vast 
array of sectors can find a place in public life (Feijó 
2014). Rebecca Strating also views semi-presiden-
tialism in a positive light as far as inclusiveness is 
concerned, claiming that ‘[t]his power-sharing dis-
tribution model can encourage consensus-oriented 
forms of democracy insofar as political leaders are 
required to negotiate’ (2016: 128).
All these features converge on the idea that 
Timor-Leste has built institutional mechanisms that 
simultaneously reveal a broadly inclusive nature 
of the organs of power; institute an effective sys-
tem of checks and balances, based on the notion 
of limited power exercised by different actors in 
their respective independent branches; and reserve 
for the citizens an active voice in the process of 
political decision-making, through fair and regu-
lar electoral mechanisms. In this light, the political 
system prior to the creation of the ‘Government of 
National Unity’, in spite of an unequal rhythm of 
development of the different branches of govern-
ance, seemed to perform well in the framework of 
the constitutional ethos of an inclusive policy. No 
major change was required to meet the require-
ments of democratic government pro tempore (Linz 
1998). However, several factors contributed to the 
emergence of this novel experience. Where did it 
find its roots?
A Long and Winding Road: (1) First Steps
Oslo, Norway, 10 December 1996. In his acceptance 
speech for the Nobel Peace Prize that had been 
bestowed upon him and the Roman Catholic Bish-
op of Díli, Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, José 
Ramos-Horta made known to the whole world the 
Timorese Resistance plan for the territory that had 
been widely agreed a few years before. This plan 
had been devised by Xanana Gusmão in the moun-
tains of Timor-Leste after his decision to break 
away from the revolutionary approach embraced 
by FRETILIN2 and espouse a nationalist stance 
with an emphasis on the emerging and pluralist 
forms of opposition to Indonesian rule, opening 
up the Resistance organisation to new forces (Feijó 
2016a: 85–87, 2016b; Niner 2009). It envisaged 
a three-step transitional process lasting up to 12 
years before the issue of self-determination would 
be directly addressed. Among the elements of their 
common ‘vision for our country’s future’ should 
the option for independence prevail, Ramos-Horta 
included: ‘We will endeavour to build a strong 
democratic state based on the rule of law which 
must emanate from the will of the people expressed 
through free and democratic elections.’ (Ramos-
Horta 1996)
Two critical elements of this proposal require 
our attention: First, the need for a protracted tran-
sitional period before the final goal was achieved, 
justified by the desire to offer Indonesia enough 
time to organise a popular consultation and eventu-
ally an orderly withdrawal — a consideration that 
future events would not sustain, as the course of 
history was suddenly accelerated in 1999. Second, 
the realisation that the scars of the 20-odd years 
elapsed since decolonisation began in 1974, namely 
the profound divisions associated with the brief 
civil war of August 1975, itself regarded as an ema-
nation of the creation of different political parties, 
still required time to consolidate their healing pro-
cess. Efforts by Xanana to give an institutional base 
to what has been described as plural nationalism, in 
which historically antagonistic figures and organi-
sations (FRETILIN and UDT,3 Ramos-Horta and 
the Carrascalão brothers) converged and brought 
along emerging actors (the Catholic Church and 
RENETIL,4 Bishop Belo and Fernando ‘Lasama’ 
de Araújo), would eventually turn into reality in 
the Resistance conference that took place in Pen-
iche, Portugal, in April 1998, with the creation of 
CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timor-
ense; National Council of Timorese Resistance) as 
the umbrella organisation of all those who opposed 
Indonesian rule, and the approval of its Magna 
Carta. Contrary to many countries which achieved 
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independence with a single ‘liberation movement’ 
most often of a monolithic nature, Timor-Leste 
emerged into its new age equipped with a plural 
nationalism, and an organisation expressing this 
plurality and operating according to consensus 
rules. The amount of time required by this organi-
sation in order to dispel the ghosts of the violent 
past did not subside with the Indonesian withdraw-
al, and can be persuasively argued to be still present 
after the referendum of 30 August 1999.
The Resistance plan had the implicit goal of 
attaining a democratic state based on free, fair and 
competitive elections among the different branches 
of Timorese opinion. This was envisaged as the end 
result of the transitional period during which the 
umbrella organisation would play a leading role 
and organise its decision-making process based on 
the principles of inclusion and consensus agreed 
in Peniche. Competitive elections were envisaged 
as following on from the establishment of sound 
consensual policies in structural domains of public 
life. The relevance of this stance was not prejudiced 
by the rapid demise of Indonesian domination in 
1999. Rather, it did sustain the first decisions of 
CNRT after the referendum, even before the arrival 
of Xanana in Díli in late October: it was widely 
accepted that CNRT would henceforth play a criti-
cal role in the life of the nascent country, retaining 
its agreed method of decision making. In brief, the 
Resistance as a whole accepted the need for a form 
of political inclusiveness that much resembled the 
idea of a ‘Government of National Unity’ for the 
first stages of the new polity.
The agreement that permitted the creation of 
CNRT was short-lived. It did not survive the arrival 
of the ‘international community’ equipped with 
what Sue Ingram has described as its ‘peacebuild-
ing template that had taken shape in the wake of 
the Cold War’, centred around the notion of a quick 
deployment of a competitive party political system, 
and which represented a clash with ‘local politi-
cal culture’ (2015b). Much in the same vein, Tanja 
Hohe speaks of a ‘clash of paradigms’ in her analy-
ses of the United Nations’ (UN) efforts at develop-
ing democratic forms of governance at the local 
level (2002, 2004). The influence of an international 
template was visible, for instance, in the failed 
attempts at creating local power through the so-
called Community Empowerment and Local Gov-
ernance Project, but most noticeably in the process 
leading up to the elections for a Constituent Assem-
bly (Feijó 2016a).
Regardless of its virtues and pitfalls, the 
approach favoured by the ‘international commu-
nity’ and openly expressed by senior members of 
UNTAET5 (Feijó 2013b) had an internal ally — 
FRETILIN, the largest and best structured party 
that was anxious to take the reins of power. The 
history of the years under UNTAET witnessed 
this confrontation, with serious implications for 
the transitional structures (e.g., the status of the 
National Consultative Council, later followed by 
the National Council), and in the design of the 
model for drafting the constitution. Xanana stood 
in opposition to the introduction of early forms of 
competitive party politics, and favoured the con-
tinuation of CNRT’s role for a transitional period 
extending several years to accomplish basic tasks of 
state-building, even after independence. However, 
Xanana and those who sided with him lost the bat-
tle for a comprehensive solution based on princi-
ples of consensual decision-making rather than by 
majoritarian vote. In August 2000, CNRT convened 
its conference in Díli, FRETILIN disagreed with 
what it considered its own under-representation 
and the decision-making methods advocated by 
Xanana and many others in the umbrella organisa-
tion, and decided to quit CNRT. Xanana responded 
by announcing the dissolution of CNRT. A rift 
was opened that would take 15 years to overcome. 
Meanwhile, the way was paved for FRETILIN to 
fight as an independent party in the 2001 election 
for the Constituent Assembly. That route eventu-
ally led to FRETILIN heading government at inde-
pendence without having to form a coalition or 
accept any sort of ‘Government of National Unity’, 
as advocated by many — an option that many years 
later Alkatiri would regret when he told me that 
‘political exclusion generates conflict’ (Feijó 2014).
Another instance with sensitive implications 
in which divisions within the Resistance move-
ment surfaced was the process for developing the 
country’s constitution (Feijó 2016a:133–70). Two 
opposing positions were put forward: one arguing 
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for a Constitutional Convention along the lines of 
the National Council (in which all political forces 
were represented, mirroring to a large extent the 
composition of CNRT), which would prepare by 
consensus a draft text to be subject to a popularly 
elected assembly destined to put the final touches 
on the document. That position was supported by 
a large number of political actors, not least Xanana 
and Ramos-Horta and the hierarchy of the Catho-
lic Church. On the opposing side, FRETILIN (with 
the support of the UN administration) argued that 
a Constitutional Assembly should be elected by 
competitive vote before the drafting of the docu-
ment could start.6 This position won. Competitive 
elections were held before a consensus on the basic 
tenets of the constitution could be agreed, and deci-
sions by the classic majority rule were introduced. 
Some outspoken voices in Timor-Leste claimed 
that this model corresponds to the most common 
template for constitution drafting. Peter Galbraith, 
UN member of the transitional cabinet in charge 
of political affairs and the Timor Sea, spoke before 
a specialised committee of the National Council in 
early 2001, insisting that
UNTAET has an obligation to hold free and 
fair elections that meet the highest interna-
tional standards and are open to all politi-
cal parties and viewpoints. Only in this way 
can UNTAET be certain that it is turning 
power over to bona fide representatives of the 
Timorese people. (quoted in Feijó 2016a:147)
In fact, only 12 per cent of all constitutions in the 
world have been drafted in this way (Elkins et al. 
2009). FRETILIN won the elections of August 2001. 
However, this party was unable to obtain the quali-
fied majority necessary to dispense with negotia-
tions, which actually took place, mostly with Fran-
cisco Xavier do Amaral’s Timorese Social Demo-
cratic Association (Associação Social Democrática 
Timorense or ASDT). In the end, the new consti-
tution was approved but most of the other politi-
cal parties with seats in the House voted against 
it, offering the nascent country a less than perfect 
starting point. More than this, FRETILIN used its 
majority to impose the transformation of the Con-
stituent Assembly into the first national parliament 
without fresh elections, as was demanded by most 
of the parties and prominent figures in the Timor-
ese society, thus obtaining the institutional condi-
tions to govern alone for five years.
The election of Xanana to the presidency with 
83 per cent of the popular vote and a high turn-
out at the polls put his appeal for the formation 
of a government of ‘National Inclusion’ back on 
the political agenda. Mari Alkatiri, sitting on an 
overall majority in the House, refused to comply 
with the president’s wishes, and formed the First 
Constitutional Government clearly dominated by 
FRETILIN, inviting only two non-partisan figures 
(José Ramos-Horta as foreign minister and Rui 
Maria de Araújo as minister for health). Again, the 
principle of majority rule was adopted at an early 
stage of the political life of the new nation, and the 
opposition to the idea of an ‘inclusive government’ 
won the day. Those who espoused the dissenting 
view that plural nationalism should be represent-
ed in the government of the new nation, arguing 
that democratic state-building required inclusive 
political solutions which would also be in line with 
deep-rooted principles of Timorese political culture 
(such as the nahe biti boot of community govern-
ance — see Babo-Soares 2004), did not give up on 
their beliefs, and waited until conditions were ripe 
for their stance to resurface.
The severe crisis that rocked Timor-Leste in 
the first half of 2006 led to the resignation of Mari 
Alkatiri. However, changes to the composition of 
the government were limited. Although the new 
prime minister was a non-partisan figure (Ramos-
Horta) who chose as his deputies another non-
partisan politician (Rui Maria de Araújo), along-
side a member of FRETILIN (Estanislau Aleixo da 
Silva), the government continued to be based solely 
on FRETILIN’s support in the House, without any 
gesture of openness to the opposition. This attitude 
of continuously erecting a barrier between the two 
sides of the national parliament could be witnessed 
in the preparation of the vital electoral legislation 
that would enable Timor-Leste to go to the polls in 
2007; an area in which consensus was desirable in 
order to generate enhanced legitimacy: those laws 
were approved by the government majority and 
rejected by the parliamentary opposition.
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The year 2007 brought new facts to the political 
landscape of Timor-Leste. First, in April, Ramos-
Horta was elected president as an ‘independent’ 
who had allegedly good relations with all sides of 
the political spectrum. Later on, in August, the 
parliamentary elections would return a FRETILIN 
plurality but far from the majority it had enjoyed 
previously. It was up to the president to take a 
decision as to whom should be appointed as prime 
minister, as the wording of the constitution kept 
several doors open. Ramos-Horta made an appeal 
to all parties to join forces in a ‘Government of 
National Unity’, retrieving Xanana’s old position. 
Only this time the former opposition and the 
newcomers to the national parliament were not 
interested in negotiating with a party that had 
shown sectarian tendencies while in power (as 
independent observers — Simonsen (2006), Siapno 
(2006), Kingsbury and Leach (2007), or Bacelar 
de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha (2009) — 
have confirmed). The time was ripe for a political 
turnover, and the former government party was 
consigned to a period in opposition. Majority 
rule as advocated by FRETILIN since the first 
elections, forcing a large political force to sit in the 
opposition, now turned against its main proponent.
A Long and Winding Road: (2) Preparing for 
Change
Xanana was the clear winner of the 2012 elec-
tions. First, Major-General Taur Matan Ruak (aka 
TMR),7 his candidate for the presidency, was elect-
ed, defeating the incumbent Ramos-Horta in the 
first ballot, and FRETILIN’s Lu Olo in the decisive 
round. Among the leaders of this historical party 
serious consideration had been given to the pos-
sibility of supporting TMR instead of filing their 
own candidate, as they believed he might be in a 
position to influence political developments condu-
cive to FRETILIN achieving new places of respon-
sibility. In a sense, their opposition at the polls was 
more formal than substantial, and the channels of 
communication between FRETILIN and TMR at 
the time seem to have been quite good. In the leg-
islative elections, Xanana’s party became the larg-
est; dispelling any doubts as to his legitimacy to be 
prime minister. On the surface of the political real-
ity, the framework seemed set for another five years 
of majority/opposition divide along a fault line that 
would keep FRETILIN in the wilderness. However, 
Xanana (and most certainly TMR) thought other-
wise — and they were not alone in that. 
As from 2012 Xanana felt free to consider, from 
a strong political position, a return to his original 
vision for a government that would embody the 
Timorese plural nationalism, and to guide a con-
trolled process of generational turnover in which he 
himself was to be included if it was to gain momen-
tum after the election of TMR for the presidency. 
In order to prepare for his own succession in the 
course of the Third Legislature, Xanana — alleg-
edly with the discreet backing of TMR — made 
the opposition two new political offers. First, he 
agreed to discuss the state budget with FRETILIN 
in a manner that eventually led to its approval by 
unanimity, a vote that would be repeated in the fol-
lowing years up to the present. This parliamentary 
entente implied the lowering of spending limits and 
offered members of parliament (MPs) across the 
board increased access to the monitoring of public 
expenses. A major concession had been made in 
order to build confidence between the rival par-
ties. Second, he sought to create the conditions for 
the leader of FRETILIN to be associated with an 
important project away from the realm of govern-
ment: offering him the leadership of the ‘Special 
Zones for Social Market Economy’ in Oecusse and 
Ataúro, together with generous funding for the pro-
ject. 
Having secured a political agreement on the 
budget and Alkatiri’s permanent occupation away 
from government through what has been labelled 
a ‘CNRT-FRETILIN love affair’ (Guterres 2015), 
the time had come for Xanana to step aside himself 
and open the door for the emergence of a Govern-
ment of National Unity — perhaps his most cher-
ished dream of 20 years or more. Alkatiri, on his 
side, argued within FRETILIN that the new solu-
tion offered his party the possibility of combin-
ing the continuation of formal opposition with the 
capacity to intervene in the process of government 
to advance important positions (Ingram and Maia 
2015). These were exactly the sort of dubious con-
ditions he had refused to accept when various par-
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ties negotiated with him in 2002 (Alkatiri 2014). 
And so the doors were open for Dr Rui Maria de 
Araújo — a well-credentialled nominee who had 
been minister for health (under Alkatiri), deputy 
prime minister (in Ramos-Horta’s cabinet), mem-
ber of the council of state (again with Ramos-Hor-
ta), advisor to several ministries, and a member of 
FRETILIN since 2010 — to be anointed to lead the 
first all-inclusive executive of Timor-Leste. 
In Search of a Rationale for Change
Political institutions and established governmen-
tal solutions possess qualities of inertia that evoke 
Newton’s First Law of Motion (‘Every object in a 
state of uniform motion tends to remain in that 
state of motion unless an external force is applied 
to it’). In this light, what needs to be explained is 
the motive that led to the introduction of a substan-
tial change in the governmental formula and the 
concurring alteration of the nature of inter-party 
relations embodied in Rui Maria de Araújo’s cabi-
net. Several possibilities emerge to account for such 
a major innovation in Timorese politics.
The adoption of a model for political organisa-
tion based on principles easily recognisable by the 
international community and substantially derived 
from established templates of Western-style liberal 
democracy was made possible with the consider-
able influence of external actors and the support of 
a part of the elite, mostly those who had recently 
returned from exile. This model has been found to 
contrast with critical elements of autochthonous 
notions of legitimacy, with which it may have enter-
tained a ‘clash of paradigms’ (Hohe 2002, 2004). As 
time passed and the presence of the international 
actors subsided in Timor-Leste, ultimately resulting 
in the withdrawal of the UN mission in late 2012, 
the terrain was left clear for ‘local political culture’ 
to prevail, and for electoral competition — the ne 
plus ultra of liberal democracy-building — to give 
way to ‘party competition [being] subordinated to 
an elite bargain about the organization of political 
power’. In this perspective, ‘[a]lthough the UN suc-
ceeded in influencing the institutional design of the 
electoral system, it did not succeed in locking in the 
rules of competitive party politics and local political 
culture has prevailed in reshaping the way the sys-
tem operates on the ground’ (Ingram 2015b). The 
idea that ‘Timorese values’ had been unduly forgot-
ten and relegated to a trivial status during the first 
phase of the political process after independence, a 
process regarded as being dominated by ‘politically 
correct’ notions imported from the international 
community, was prominent in the 2012 presiden-
tial election. Ramos-Horta and his cosmopolitan 
persona associated with the classical values of an 
expatriate elite, who had ably performed his role 
as prime minister and later president, helping to 
pacify social unrest after the violent crisis of 2006, 
and had exerted his influence on behalf of Timor-
Leste in international arenas (UN, ASEAN, CPLP8) 
was defeated. The two candidates who proceeded 
to the second round of that election (Taur Matan 
Ruak and Lu Olo) both made a point that they had 
always lived inside the territory and were closer to 
the ‘Timorese values’ which they wished to bring 
to the fore in the ensuing political cycle. This set of 
considerations renders it plausible that key players 
like Xanana Gusmão, who had exercised political 
power both as president and prime minister with-
out ever being able to match those experiences with 
his fundamental belief on the nature of the desir-
able solutions that gave justice to the plural form 
of nationalism he had championed since the mid-
1980s, found new allies (namely, in the new presi-
dent) to finally combine in an original formula the 
requirements of liberal democracy and local politi-
cal culture.
A second argument hinges on the necessary 
generational turnover. Few countries in the world 
have a political elite that travelled all the way 
from the times when Portugal opened up the way 
for decolonisation in 1974. Forty-odd years on, 
a very substantial number of the top politicians 
in the country continue to be the members of 
the so-called Gerasaun Tuan (Old Generation) 
— Xanana, Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Mário 
Carrascalão — whereas the generation that was 
formed under Indonesian occupation — the 
Gerasaun Foun (New Generation) of the likes of 
Rui Maria de Araújo, the late Fernando ‘Lasama’ 
de Araújo, Dionísio Babo, José Teixeira — was left 
in waiting and relegated to supporting roles. The 
generation of Katuas (old men) had for some time 
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contemplated the need to initiate a handover to 
the younger one (Alkatiri 2014). As Michael Leach 
has argued, ‘[t]his extraordinary remaking of the 
government … is clearly designed to smooth the 
transition from the 1975 generation of leaders 
that has dominated post-independence politics’ 
(18/2/2015). Of course, the elders remain active, 
but the younger men were given their fair chance 
to promotion in a sort of ‘pacted transition’ (to use 
here a parallel with some processes of transition to 
democracy). Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araújo 
addressed this issue head-on in his speech:
If our older brothers and sisters, who one 
day decided that national unity was vital for 
ensuring the survival of our Nation and who 
led us to our freedom, now tell us that it is 
once again necessary to converge ideas, poli-
cies, actions and priorities around the com-
mon cause of the consolidation and develop-
ment of Timor‐Leste, then we, the younger 
generation, must say that we are indeed ready 
to take on this responsibility! (2015:3)
Only one element is missing in the original plan 
circulated informally in Díli: the formation of a 
‘Council of Katuas’ to oversee the government. This 
encountered insurmountable constitutional obsta-
cles, as it would represent an official but unelected 
organ of power, and therefore run contrary to the 
ethos of the system. The need to address genera-
tional turnover was thus an element present in the 
decision-making process, even if it could have been 
done in ways not necessarily entailing the forma-
tion of a government of ‘inclusion’. Perhaps the one 
factor explaining why this solution was contem-
plated was that Xanana needed to choose a prime-
ministerial candidate whom he could support. He 
made it known that within the ranks of the prevail-
ing majority coalition he could see no one to step 
into his shoes — a decision that ‘did not sit well with 
the heads of Gusmão’s coalition partners nor his own 
party, CNRT’ (Guterres 2015; Ingram 2015a).
Thirdly, one should not exclude pressing exter-
nal factors at play in the decisions that were made. 
The restoration of internal peace after the crisis of 
2006 had been achieved by Xanana’s administra-
tion by virtue of generous public spending made 
possible by the revenues of the Petroleum Fund. 
Two policies stand out: one is the introduction of 
expensive social transfers, most notably for the ‘vet-
erans’ who became key beneficiaries of very broad 
and generous social policies (about 7 per cent of the 
national budget is allocated directly to the ‘veterans 
pensions’, excluding other fringe benefits — more 
than the amount allocated to the health ministry), 
as well as influential actors in the political process 
(Roll 2014). The second is the Strategic Develop-
ment Plan (2011–30) — ‘a twenty year vision that 
reflects the aspirations of the Timorese people to 
create a prosperous and strong country’ (RDTL 
2011) — aiming to transform the country’s econ-
omy into a mid-level income one in 20 years, and 
based on heavy infrastructural investments. Xanana 
Gusmão has been deeply involved in both policy 
areas. However, for a significant number of observ-
ers, the levels of budgetary spending were alarm-
ingly high in view of the sustainability of the public 
finances. Not only were the prices of oil plum-
meting in the world market with important con-
sequences for the prospects of the Timorese own 
fund (the year 2015 ended with the fund at its low-
est since May 2014, and $389 million below its level 
on 1 January), but after the Petroleum Fund was 
established successive governments had withdrawn 
amounts in excess of the Estimated Sustainable 
Income that it generates. The local non-government 
organisation La’o Hamutuk is well known for artic-
ulate arguments in sharp criticism of the govern-
ment budgetary options. A new course of action 
was deemed necessary, and this was made all the 
more pressing since the Fifth Constitutional Gov-
ernment was ‘bloated and underperforming’ with 
its 54 ministers, vice-ministers and secretaries of 
state (Ingram 2015a) — almost as many members 
of government as parliamentarians (60). It is argu-
able that Xanana was aware of the situation, and he 
devised a strategy to initiate a political hand-over 
that guaranteed his remaining on board to take 
part in the monitoring of any new developments 
that might be required. But clearly the opposition 
should be brought to share government responsi-
bilities in order to face the problem without being 
hampered by factionalism in parliament. Political 
bargaining among a restricted elite took precedence 
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over normal channels of institutional political 
negotiation.
Expectations of a political shift of priorities, 
as some had harboured (including President Taur 
Matan Ruak), may have been exaggerated. If the 
new prime minister’s inauguration speech is a 
barometer to test those suppositions, he only made 
a very cursory reference to the controversial issue 
of veterans’ privileges (as if acknowledging this 
would be a matter for further consideration away 
from the limelight of a public ceremony). He also 
reiterated his commitment to the Strategic Devel-
opment Plan — as is congruent with the decision to 
keep Xanana as Minister for Planning and Strategic 
Investment. The first test came in the form of the 
first state budget under the helm of Rui Maria de 
Araújo, which is one of continuity.
What’s to be Expected from the New Government 
Formula?
‘Governments of National Unity’ are extraordi-
nary solutions that tend to emerge at very critical 
moments in a country’s life, not as a regular form of 
solving the problems of governance. Recent inde-
pendence (Timor-Leste in 2002), the conduct of 
war (Britain in 1940–45) and a severe economic 
crisis (Portugal in 1983) are examples of excep-
tional circumstances in which governments with 
very wide parliamentary support bases subordinate 
political competition in the name of a superior 
goal for a limited time. Unless one believes that 
the nature of the political problem in present day 
Timor-Leste is of a similar magnitude, the form 
of the Sixth Constitutional Government appears 
ill-fitted to the circumstances. Alternatively, one 
may consider that it represents a by-passing of the 
conventional process and the benchmarks of demo-
cratic consolidation and a manifestation of a novel 
‘Timorese way to democracy’ that requires seri-
ous consideration. Without pre-empting the need 
to offer an answer to these vexed questions, one 
should analyse the positive aspects associated with 
the emergence of this government formula, and 
discuss some of its eventual pitfalls. I shall focus on 
three on each side of the argument.
The new formula contributed to lowering the 
heat of the political struggle between CNRT and 
FRETILIN that was often rather high. As recently as 
2012, the aftermath of the parliamentary elections 
had seen an outbreak of verbal struggle, with events 
escalating to street confrontations resulting in one 
casualty. Political debate is now more vigorously 
set within the framework of the country’s institu-
tions and their urbane rules. However, it should be 
noted that the emergence of an actual government 
solution encompassing FRETILIN members was 
preceded by two and half years of a rapprochement 
process, evidenced in the unanimous approval of 
state budgets as from 2012 — a symbol of a rather 
civil form of political confrontation. 
Michael Leach has argued that this formula, 
which seems to have been concocted in the seclu-
sion of an old elite bargaining room, brings with 
it ‘an attempt to move to a different type of politi-
cal legitimacy, rational-legal in orientation, less 
reliant on the incumbent’s personal history and 
more dependent on performance and outcomes’ 
(18/2/2015). It is also accompanied by a positive 
move away from Weberian charismatic forms of 
leadership to a model that is entirely compatible 
with commonly accepted democratic means of 
political power legitimisation. 
The new solution responds to widespread 
notions of Timorese political culture that stub-
bornly survived through the years and disregard 
party competition in favour of other forms of set-
tling disputes. This element of traditional political 
culture was relegated to a secondary position by the 
international community’s template for democracy, 
but it retained sound roots in the Timorese popula-
tion and in some of its leaders, and seems to have 
made a successful comeback. In this sense, it can 
be argued that the underlying assumptions sustain-
ing this government reinforce the sense of owner-
ship of the political process without which institu-
tions risk being hollow, like a phantom state which 
may endow its organs of sovereignty with material 
resources but insufficient means of social legitimacy 
(Lemay-Hébert 2012:476). Even if we supposed that 
the establishment of the democratic regime owed 
more to external impositions than to internal forces 
— which is not the case — the issue remains that 
democratic consolidation cannot avoid being a pro-
cess based on the mobilisation of internal, national 
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forces. The underlying assumption is that regardless 
of the nature of the actors in the play, the owner-
ship of the show belongs to the nation’s citizenry, 
who must feel comfortable with the instruments 
deployed to guarantee their self-determination and 
the free expression of their options. Democracy as 
an institutional means to empower citizens at large 
cannot ignore the language they speak.
These positive aspects must not divert us from 
some serious challenges that the new political solu-
tion is bound to face in the coming years. First, it 
is well known that the institutional development of 
the different organs of national sovereignty is quite 
uneven. On top of the list one finds the govern-
ment, always considered the one better equipped 
to discharge its functions. Conversely, at the bot-
tom of the list, the judiciary suffers from severe 
weaknesses. In between those extremes, the presi-
dency managed to establish itself as a competent 
institution, granted with basic conditions to fulfil 
its mandate, after long and painful years during 
which its institutional capacity was quite low. As 
for the national parliament, even if conditions have 
improved, it still lacks the know-how that only time 
brings, and remains the fragile institution described 
by Shoesmith in 2008 (a,b). The semi-presidential 
regime that Timor-Leste adopted accords a major 
role to parliament in the monitoring and control 
of government action, which presupposes a sub-
stantial degree of independence between the two 
bodies. In this framework, the actual interplay of 
institutions supposed to offer a system of checks 
and balances is in practice significantly different 
from the constitutional model, which presumes an 
equal development of all components. The fact that 
there is no real opposition in the House given that 
all parties now sit in government raises doubts as 
to the capacity of the national parliament to rise 
above rubber-stamping government decisions and 
discharge its functions of controlling and monitor-
ing the action of government. This situation places 
a great burden on the shoulders of President Taur 
Matan Ruak. Unlike some semi-presidential coun-
tries, like France, where the president is supposed 
to be a party member and thus either to lead the 
support to government or the opposition to the 
executive, Timor-Leste falls in the category that 
Maurice Duverger called of ‘presidents without 
majority’ who are called to perform their mandate 
as ‘independent’ figures above party competition 
(Duverger 1996:516–17; see also Elgie 2011:185–86; 
Feijó 2014, 2016a:233–42). This was, by and large, 
the legacy of Xanana and Ramos-Horta as presi-
dents. New circumstances offer the president an 
increasingly central role in monitoring and control-
ling the activities of government, as an overvalued 
executive branch may have a tendency to tilt the 
balance of power in one direction at the expense 
of the equilibrium required by a sound democratic 
practice. A major test to the semi-presidential sys-
tem is thus on the cards. Recent developments as 
from late 2015 (presidential veto to the budget, clash 
over the military command, opposition to changes 
in the National Electoral Commission) suggest that 
the president is assuming a new high-profile role in 
competition with the governmental majority, with 
implications on the stability of the system.
If the government is poorly monitored, and the 
dissatisfaction that some of its decisions inevitably 
generate in the electorate are not addressed within 
the system, especially in parliament (but eventually 
through the voice of the president), the risk exists 
that public dissatisfaction will instead be expressed 
outside the boundaries of the institutions. One has 
to bear in mind that in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections 20 per cent of the electors voted for 
political parties that could not elect a single MP 
— an extremely high proportion of effectively 
disenfranchised Timorese. Phenomena such as 
the one embodied by the late Mauk Moruk,9 who 
is supposed to have expressed the anger of some 
Timorese that feel unprotected by the current state 
of affairs, may be repeated, under unforeseeable 
forms and with dire consequences to the stability 
of the regime. Both parliament and president must 
make a serious effort in order to maintain some 
forms of control and monitoring of the government 
activity in the public domain in order to avoid 
these perils. Institutional unanimity on issues of 
political controversy may be a nicely decorated 
façade hiding the erosion of the public perception 
of the legitimacy of institutions. The recent creation 
of a new party (PLP — Partido da Libertação do 
Povo; People’s Liberation Party) with the unofficial 
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support of the president may be regarded as a 
move destined to occupy some political vacuum 
in the ranks of the opposition, made easier by the 
agreement between CNRT and FRETILIN, and 
thus to redress a lost balance in the party system 
after the ‘eclipse’ of the opposition.10
Second, a super-majority government may be 
tempted to manage the newly acquired wealth of 
the country in a neo-patrimonial way, involving all 
major political actors in ‘pork barrelling’, or even 
going beyond the legal (but legitimately dubious) 
allocation of public resources by deploying a system 
of social hierarchy where patrons use state resourc-
es in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the 
general population based on an informal patron-
client relationship — a form of political behav-
iour that is not alien to local mores. Timor-Leste’s 
record on the issue of corruption and clientelism is 
not brilliant, and it has not improved in the course 
of recent years. Transparency International’s Index 
of Perceived Corruption (2014) ranks Timor-Leste 
at 133 in a list of 175 countries, with a score of 28 
(in which 0 is the most corrupt and 100 the least) 
— but the country has been sliding down the scale 
in the last three issues of this index. Of course, this 
is not a country-specific phenomenon, as it com-
pares with most of its Southeast Asian neighbours. 
But then again, democracy is not one of the hall-
marks of this part of the world.
This peril is compounded by the fragility and 
lack of perceived independence of the judicial sys-
tem in the country. Again, the context of uneven 
development of the various branches of power gen-
erates a situation in which a perfectly legitimate 
solution emerging from parliament may paradoxi-
cally stimulate behaviours that are in breach of 
the best practices of democracy, exacerbating the 
concentration of executive powers at the expense 
of those normally consigned to controlling bodies. 
Action is urgently required on this front — namely, 
in the strengthening of the Court of Audits whose 
role in the control of public tenders in particular, 
and of public spending in general is critical — so 
that the judicial system may offer a substantial 
contribution to lowering negative impacts of clien-
telism on socioeconomic development.
Thirdly, a word about the solidity of the party 
system that sustains the new executive. There is no 
formal coalition pact sustaining the current govern-
ment, which is based on a gentlemen’s agreement. 
Moreover, the nature of the essentially political 
compromise has been publicly disguised under the 
veil of the ‘technical competence’ of the FRETILIN 
cadres appointed who do not ‘officially represent’ 
their party — a stance that is blatantly denied by 
the portfolios entrusted to those politicians: the 
premiership, a minister of state in charge of eco-
nomic coordination, the minister of foreign affairs 
— all essentially political rather than ‘technical’ 
jobs. This cover-up of reality, even if the ‘accept-
ance’ by FRETILIN to offer its cadres was acknowl-
edged in the prime minister’s inauguration speech, 
does not bode well for future developments, as it 
reveals frailty in the whole process. The fact that 
the government is led by a political figure emerg-
ing from the previous opposition, rather than 
by someone from the largest party in the House, 
although it is not uncommon in parliamentary 
democracies, owes a lot to the fragility of CNRT 
leadership, extremely dependent on the towering 
figure of Xanana Gusmão. He made it public that 
he did not consider any of the key figures from the 
coalition that supported his government were fit 
to replace him, adding fuel to the suspicions that 
this party would face difficulties in surviving his 
departure. A clarification of the situation is bound 
to occur before the end of the current legislature, 
and there are several alternatives to consider: will 
a pre-electoral coalition be formed? Will the par-
ties go it alone and pledge to re-establish a similar 
government after the elections? Will a new leader 
emerge in CNRT who will be in a position to 
establish an imprint on the party independently of 
Xanana and compete for the top job? Would FRE-
TILIN still support a government in which its posi-
tion was reduced in the face of the electoral results? 
Or will they repeat this experience if the electorate 
awards them a majority? What will be the effect of 
the next election on the behaviour of the parties 
that have committed themselves to a new politi-
cal solution that has been presented as the basis 
for a long period, not just as an intermediate solu-
tion to last till 2017, but so far failed to elaborate a 
sound political agreement regarding critical issues? 
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In brief: the political basis of support for the cur-
rent government, despite appearing very broad, may 
prove to be fragile until such time as the leaders of 
the two major parties face their party members and 
have their party conferences choose a new leader 
who is not a member of the ‘generation of ’75’ (thus 
incorporating into their party’s internal organisation 
the same sort of shift that was produced at govern-
ment level), who can then fight a popular election to 
legitimise the current arrangements (or devise some 
new one). The situation may be further complicated 
if the new party emerges with important support, 
proposing a clear turn away from the strategic ori-
entations that have been pursued (namely the heavy 
investments in the National Strategic Plan which are 
financially burdensome and produce few short-term 
returns), and rallying around a popular figure from 
the not so small set of those who are not aligned 
with the current majority. The Timorese party sys-
tem has shown a high degree of volatility, and each 
new election has brought a different configuration 
to its structure (Feijó 2016a:190–92). The stability 
of the new formula is contingent on the resilience 
of the existing parties — a condition that is far from 
guaranteed.
The stakes are high and call for our continuous 
attention over the coming years.
One and a Half Years After: A New Challenge
Ever since Aristotle’s Physics, it has been received 
wisdom that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’. Politics can 
also be said to react to the horror vacui, and tends 
not to let formalities supersede socially grounded 
realities, harsh as they may be. As stated above, the 
formation of a government including all parties in 
the national parliament reduced the ability of this 
institution to harbour dissenting views on the poli-
cies being pursued and to voice criticism that per-
meates society, forfeiting a major purpose of the 
central institution of democratic life. Eventually, 
this change of circumstances has led to the ampli-
fication of a gulf between the plurality of popular 
sentiments and the narrowing of the institutional 
expression of alternatives, which President Taur 
Matan Ruak seems to have attempted to capture. It 
is in the nature of democracy that alternatives exist 
to any policy, combining differently the associated 
costs and benefits. Timor-Leste is no exception to 
the rule. What came as a surprise to many was the 
voice that rose to challenge the political option of 
the new government: President Taur Matan Ruak, 
widely credited with a positive contribution to the 
negotiations that culminated in the inter-partisan 
deal that sustains Rui Maria de Araújo.
The first serious intervention of President Taur 
Matan Ruak was made in the preparation of the 
state budget for 2016, when he argued that the vast 
number of visits he has paid to sukus (or villages: he 
claims to have travelled to three-quarters of them 
all) had convinced him that a change of course was 
required with more resources made available for 
health, education, rural extension and other specific 
policies. In parallel, he raised doubts about veter-
ans’ privileges and the mega-projects of investment 
in heavily concentrated development sites, such as 
the Suai Supply Base (whose initial contract was 
vetoed by the Court of Accounts) or the Oecussi 
venture. These are massive public investment pro-
jects, inscribed in the Strategic Development Plan 
running up to 2030, dependent of a continuous, 
high level of revenues from petroleum, and which 
have attracted critical reviews. Matters came to a 
head when the president vetoed the state budget 
approved by unanimity in the House, sending par-
liament a very critical letter with his objections 
that echo an altogether different approach to the 
government’s (TMR 29/12/2015). The government 
refused to accept any of the president’s sugges-
tions and submitted the budget to a new vote in 
the House without changing a single cent — and it 
was again approved unanimously. Under the con-
stitution, the president could not refuse to prom-
ulgate the returned budget law, but he did exercise 
his power to refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court for ‘successive appreciation’. The first round 
thus found its way into the courts and scars were 
undoubtedly left on both sides.
The second round came a few weeks later when 
President Taur Matan Ruak refused to renew the 
appointment of the General Chief of Staff of the 
Armed Forces, Major General Lere Anan Timur, 
who had been proposed by the government, and 
insisted on nominating for the job someone of his 
own choice. Once again, the government responded 
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in the most severe way by deciding the 
interposition of an appeal [to the Court of 
Appeals acting as Constitutional Court] for the 
annulment of the [presidential] decision to dis-
miss the General Chief of Staff of the Defence 
Force and the Deputy General Chief of Staff of 
the Defence Force, as well as the subsequent 
decision to appoint a new General Chief of 
Staff of the Defence Force … (PCM 24/2/2016)
President Taur Matan Ruak asked to be heard in 
the national parliament, where he appeared to stage 
a personal attack on Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alka-
tiri, associating both with the spread of the ‘virus of 
corruption’ and nepotism, and reiterating his criti-
cism of the financial options inscribed in the budget 
(Alvarez 25/2/2016). The immediate response of 
Xanana’s CNRT was to consider moving impeach-
ment procedures against the president for the ‘vio-
lation of his constitutional mandate’ (Lusa 2016). 
The president backtracked and engaged in conversa-
tions with government. This process dragged on for 
months and witnessed several provisional solutions 
being successively dismissed by some stakeholders. 
More recently, another important front was 
opened in the opposition between the president and 
the government; in this case regarding the composi-
tion and functions of the sensitive National Electoral 
Commission, a piece of legislation vetoed by Taur 
Matan Ruak who was once again forced to sign it 
after a second vote in parliament.
It is now clear that the president has taken a 
bold attitude in voicing the discontent that the cur-
rent government policies — namely, the persistence 
of high levels of poverty, the apparently weak fight 
against corruption and the obscure nature of the 
decisions on major investment plans such as the Taci 
Mane or the Oecussi projects — generate in public 
opinion. At present, President Taur Matan Ruak is 
the visible face of the opposition that has vanished 
from the national parliament. The evolution of the 
relative positions of the main political actors and 
the scope of the political crisis that the succession 
of clashes between president and prime minister has 
generated call for a reconsideration of the merits 
of the Timorese form of semi-presidentialism. This 
government system has permitted the emergence of 
competition over the definition of powers between 
the heads of state and government, including the 
sensitive issue of the armed forces — as happened 
back in 2006, prompting Lydia Beuman to claim 
that the issue of defence policy was the Achilles 
heel of the system (2013:20; 2016) — an issue made 
more sensitive by the fact that the current president 
is the previous leader of the armed forces.
To add a new dimension to the issues at stake, 
a new political party (PLP) has been formally reg-
istered, and rumour has it that it may serve as the 
launching pad for Taur Matan Ruak to fight for 
the premiership in the legislative elections due in 
mid-2017, after his term as president expires. This 
eventuality would replicate what Xanana did back 
in 2007, creating CNRT in time to assume its lead-
ership in between the two elections.
Given these developments, the move to bring 
into the executive the party that occupied the seats 
of the opposition in the House in order to generate 
a ‘Government of National Unity’ must be viewed 
sceptically. It did add an element of ‘national inclu-
sion’ to the government, but it seems to have fallen 
short of the aspired ‘national unity’. On the con-
trary, failure to address strategic decisions that were 
for some actors important aspects of the hopes 
with which they welcomed the formation of the 
Sixth Constitutional Government, and which could 
be larger than the 20 per cent of electors who had 
failed to secure a representative in the 2012 elec-
tions, may have contributed to opening up a serious 
rift in the central institutions of the country now 
present in the open confrontation between Presi-
dent Taur Matan Ruak and the forces that sustain 
the Sixth Constitutional Government. It is still to 
be determined what Timor-Leste has gained with 
its decision to recast some of the rules of the game, 
such as the new government formula.
Conclusion
The emergence of a government of ‘national inclu-
sion’ raises the question of the concentration of 
powers that only the improved performance of the 
other organs of sovereignty may counterbalance. 
As Anthony L. Smith judiciously remarked back in 
2004 when referring to the nascent political situa-
tion in Timor-Leste, a strong government may be 
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the other side of the coin of a weak state — exactly 
the reverse of what the consolidation of democracy 
actually requires. The paradox that an ‘all-inclusive’ 
government may after all not contribute to ‘nation-
al unity’ (as new forms of expressing opposition 
emerge) nor to an equilibrium of powers at the core 
of the system of checks and balances that is a hall-
mark of democracy by stretching executive privileg-
es too far will only be solved by the passage of time. 
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Endnotes
1  The idea of qualifying ‘democracy’ with adjectives 
has a long tradition in political literature. Collier and 
Levitsky (1997) have found more than 500 examples 
of such proposals. Agio Pereira’s classification is not 
necessarily based on established academic concepts, 
as the qualification ‘belligerent’ is mostly associated 
with the relationships between democracies and war 
(‘There is no such a thing as belligerent democracy’, 
Sharansky and Dermer 2004: 94; see also Narang 
and Nelson 2009), and ‘consensus’ democracy 
(in the sense of ‘consociational democracy’) is a 
hallmark of Arend Lijphart’s work (1969, 1999). 
These terms should rather be broadly interpreted as 
form of opposing political competition to inter-party 
arrangements.
2  Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Indenpendente (Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor).
3  União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Demo-
cratic Party).
4  Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste 
(National Resistance of East Timorese Students).
5  The United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor.
6  It should be stressed that after the constitutional 
elections of 30 August 2001, FRETILIN opposed the 
organisation of fresh polls after the completion of 
that assembly’s work, in fact postponing for at least 
five years the introduction of party competition in 
what was a para-constitutional provision with serious 
implications for the acrimony between the main 
actors.
7  José Maria Vasconcelos is commonly known by his 
Tetum nom de guerre Taur Matan Ruak (Two Sharp 
Eyes).
8  Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries.
9  Mauk Moruk was a guerrilla fighter who broke up 
with Xanana’s leadership in 1983 and was caught by 
the Indonesians. After being paraded in Timor as a 
trophy in the struggle against the nationalist forces, 
he was allowed to migrate to Holland where he lived 
until 2012. Then he returned to challenge Xanana’s 
leadership again. He set up a group of disgruntled 
Timorese and strongly opposed the constitutional 
order. After a time of tension, he was eventually killed 
in a shootout with police forces in his native Laga, in 
the east of the country.
10  After the inauguration of the sixth government, 
PD (Partido Democratico) was forced to leave the 
all-inclusive formula but has not assumed a strong 
opposition stance, although it is expected to side with 
the new PLP in the next elections. 
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